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Roman Judges, Case Law, and 
Principles of Procedure 
Ernest Metzger, University of Aberdeen 
—————————— 
Roman law has been admired for a long time.  Its admirers, in their enthusiasm, have 
sometimes borrowed ideas from their own time and attributed them to the Romans, 
thereby filling some gap or fixing some anomaly.  Roman private law is a well known 
victim of this.  Roman civil procedure has been a victim as well, and the way Roman 
judges are treated in the older literature provides an example.  For a long time it has 
been accepted, and rightly so, that the decision of a Roman judge did not make law.  
But the related, empirical question, whether Roman judges ever relied on the 
decisions of other judges, has been largely ignored.  The common opinion which 
today correctly rejects "case law" passes over "precedent" without comment.  It does 
so because for many years an anachronistic view of the Roman judge was in fashion.  
This was the view that a Roman judge's decision expressed the people's sense of right 
about a specific set of facts.  A decision, on this view, is simply a piece of information 
for an expert to examine; it has no value to another judge.  With the passing of this 
view, however, the common opinion could accept the existence of precedent in 
Roman law. 
—————————— 
Most who study Roman law today do so as historians, not lawyers.  History 
includes doctrine, but Roman legal doctrine is rarely used to solve modern 
problems.  There are exceptions: Roman law helps to solve modern problems 
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in certain jurisdictions1 and academic writing sometimes gives a Roman 
solution to a modern problem.2  But the time is past when Roman sources 
were routinely put to work in the world of affairs,3 and most would say 
codification is the main reason.4 
It is not a cause for regret.  During virtually all of its "second life" Roman 
law has avoided becoming a specialist subject for antiquaries.  Roman lawyers 
of the past wanted the world's attention and they got it: they spread Roman 
learning widely and profoundly.  Also, codification made permanent some 
very good Roman ideas, even if the effect on legal science was not entirely 
good.5  The problem now is that Roman law has not yet recovered from its 
 
1 There is a short discussion, with literature, of Roman law as a living source of 
authority in A. Lewis, "Roman Law in the Middle of its Third Millennium," Current Legal 
Problems 50 (1997): 414-17.  In the United Kingdom, Roman law has been used 
conspicuously in Indian Oil Corp. v. Greenstone Shipping SA (Panama), [1988] Q.B. 345; 
Shilliday v. Smith, 1998 Sess. Cas. 725; and most recently in Scotland: McDyer v. The Celtic 
Football and Athletic Co., 2000 Sess. Cas. 379, where a football spectator was injured by a 
falling object.  On McDyer and the use of Roman law in Scotland see Tammo Wallinga, 
"Effusa uel deiecta in Rome and Glasgow," Edinburgh Law Review 6 (2002): 117-123. 
2 The best examples of this are not blind applications of Roman rules, but 
demonstrations of how Roman law achieves something the modern law for some reason does 
not.  See Alan Rodger, "Mrs. Donoghue and Alfenus Varus," 1988 Current Legal Problems 1-
22; Peter Birks, "Harassment and Hubris. The Right to an Equality of Respect," The Irish 
Jurist (n.s.) 32 (1997): 1-45. 
3 The view that the study of Roman law today is largely historical is discussed by 
Lewis, "Roman Law," 414-419.  But others wish the situation were different.  Wieacker had 
hopes that legal history could be conceived in such a way that it remained part of legal 
science.  He had in mind a mostly doctrinally-oriented historical study.  See Franz Wieacker, 
A History of Private Law in Europe, trans. T. Weir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 336-40.  
Zimmermann's view is similar to Wieacker's.  See, e.g., Reinhard Zimmermann, "Savigny's 
Legacy: Legal History, Comparative Law, and the Emergence of a European Legal Science," 
Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996): 576-605.  Zimmermann regrets that "A neo-humanistic 
approach to legal history has superseded the historical approach to legal science," ibid., 598, 
and suggests that legal history can help to find common doctrinal features underlying 
European legal systems, ibid., 600-1.  Similarly: Reinhard Zimmermann, "Roman and 
Comparative Law: The European Perspective (Some Remarks apropos a Recent 
Controversy)," Journal of Legal History 16 (1995): 226.  Jolowicz would be sympathetic to 
Zimmermann's view.  H. F. Jolowicz, "Utility and Elegance in Civil Law Systems," Law 
Quarterly Review 65 (1949): 322-36. 
4 Zimmermann discusses the point at length, but does not attribute the return of 
historical Roman law solely or even predominantly to codification.  Reinhard Zimmermann, 
Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 46-52.    
5 Zimmermann, Roman Law, 1, notes that codification fragmented the European legal 
tradition, but it is very much part of his argument that the tradition was continuous 
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success.  In reading the work of his predecessors, a historian often comes 
across ideas that are ostensibly Roman but look very modern.  These ideas 
have perhaps crept in when someone has used the sources for a worthy 
purpose, but has not read them in a properly historical spirit.  This is not to say 
that historians of today are pitted against lawyers of yesterday.  Anyone who 
has taken an interest in the ideas expressed in Roman legal sources6 is 
particularly liable to this kind of error.  This is because the ideas, though 
useful, may have been imperfectly developed or expressed by the Romans, or 
imperfectly handed down.  Someone who discovered an idea and wanted to 
use it may have seen more than was actually there.  If the blame lies 
anywhere, it lies in the quality of the ideas and the admiration they inspire.  
We therefore forgive the Commentators their generalizations, the natural 
lawyers their logic and geometry, and the pandectists their reliance on the very 
words of the Corpus Iuris Civilis.7  But we nevertheless feel a special kinship 
with those of our predecessors who took a critical attitude to the texts, even 
when we disagree with them.8 
 Roman private law is of course the more famous victim in this respect,9 
 
notwithstanding codification. 
6 As opposed to, for example, the history of the ideas or the sources themselves. 
7 See P. Stein, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 73; M. H. Hoeflich, "Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to 
Langdell," American Journal of Legal History 30 (1986): 96-109; Zimmermann, Roman Law, 
18-19.  A common illustration of this is the use of "maxims" which, in their original context, 
were narrow explanations of rulings, not generalized principles.  See Peter Stein, "Civil Law 
Maxims in Moral Philosophy," Tulane Law Review 48 (1974): 1076.  Buckland made 
pandectist scholarship a special target: "German writers often seem to attribute to Roman law 
rules and modes of thought which are the product of later ages."  W. W. Buckland, "Wardour 
Street Roman Law," Law Quarterly Review 17 (1901): 179. 
8 E.g., the French humanists and the Dutch elegant school.  See especially Lewis, 
"Roman Law," 403-8, who suggests that, instead of placing ourselves in the tradition of a 
revived Roman law beginning around AD 1000, we should acknowledge the historical nature 
of the present discipline and place ourselves 500 years into a historical tradition, beginning 
with humanist scholarship. 
9 Several examples are given in Buckland, "Wardour Street Roman Law," 179-92, and 
W. W. Buckland, "More Wardour Street Roman Law: the actio de in rem verso," Law 
Quarterly Review 31 (1915): 193-216.  See also Alan Watson, "Illogicality and Roman Law," 
Israel Law Review 7 (1972): 14 (= Alan Watson, Legal Origins and Legal Change (London: 
Hambledon Press, 1991), 251)("[T]he usefulness of Roman law for later ages, coupled with its 
enforced isolation from other systems of antiquity, has often led to an exaggerated respect for 
it, and to its being regarded as well-nigh perfect, immutable, fit for all people."); F. de 
Zulueta, The Roman Law of Sale (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945; reprinted 1957), 25 ("So 
long as the Corpus Iuris was in force as actual law, a harmonious doctrine had to be extracted 
from the texts, even at the cost of forced interpretations . . . ."); H. J. Wolff, Roman Law: An 
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but the law of civil procedure has suffered as well, and that is the subject here.  
Our knowledge of Roman civil procedure is based on the smallest evidence.  
We have a single example of a treatise on procedure in book four of Gaius' 
Institutes (though Gaius writes more on actions than on procedure proper), 
together with a body of expurgated classical texts, fragments of statutes, and 
some documents prepared for litigation.  The scarcity of the evidence, and the 
gap-filling required to make it make sense, have made textbook discussions of 
procedure vulnerable to fashion.  The problem is made worse by the fact that 
the evidence has tended to trickle in,10 so that an idea, though widely accepted, 
may be based on outdated evidence.  Anyone who studies procedure should be 
wary of ideas that have passed from textbook to textbook without change, and 
accept that many of these ideas are open to revision. 
Where do these ideas come from?  The easiest explanation is that when 
writers of the past found a gap in the evidence on procedure they simply 
supplied an idea from the modern law.  This would explain in particular why 
some Roman procedure seems to reflect the ideas of nineteenth-century 
German writers, who were seeking to reform their own laws and institutions.11  
 
Historical Introduction (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), 219-20 ("[That 
excerpts from the Digest] had to be taken for authoritative statements of valid law compelled 
the Pandectists to assume too conservative an attitude regarding the sources.").  On the 
gradual break of legal history from legal science see Mathias Reimann, "Nineteenth Century 
German Legal Science," Boston College Law Review 31 (1990): 871-73; Wieacker, History, 
330-34. 
10 The discovery of Gaius' Institutes in 1816 is the most obvious example, but there are 
many other examples of discoveries that have significantly added to our knowledge of Roman 
procedure: lex de Gallia Cisalpina (Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford (London: Institute of 
Classical Studies, 1996), vol. 1, no. 28), discovered in 1760; the Fragmenta Vaticana (P. E. 
Huschke, E. Seckel, and B. Kuebler, Iurisprudentiae Anteiustinianae Reliquias (Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1927), 2/2:191-324), discovered in 1821; lex Coloniae Genetivae (Roman Statutes, 
ed. M. Crawford, vol. 1, no. 25), discovered in 1870, the Este Fragment (Roman Statutes, ed. 
M. Crawford, vol. 1, no. 16), discovered in 1880; collections of waxed tablets from Pompeii, 
Puteoli, and Herculaneum, discovered in the last 100 years, for which see Peter Gröschler, Die 
tabellae-Urkunden aus den pompejanischen und herkulanensischen Urkundenfunden (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1997); and the lex Irnitana (J. González, "The Lex Irnitana: A New 
Copy of the Flavian Municipal Law," Journal of Roman Studies 76 (1986): 147-243), 
discovered in 1981. 
11 The most well-known example of this, which considerably affects procedure, is the 
supposed "intuition" of the Roman jurists.  The idea that a Roman jurist, as a member of a 
professional class, had special powers of discerning the law, was put forward by Savigny, and 
followed by some even in modern times.  See Max Kaser, "Zur Methode der römischen 
Rechtsfindung," in Ausgewählte Schriften (Camerino: Jovene, 1976), 1:10-14; A. Arthur 
Schiller, "Jurists' Law," in An American Experience in Roman Law (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht, 1971), 159, and the critical comments by Laurens Winkel, "The Role of General 
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The problem with this explanation is not that it is wrong, but that 
"anachronism" as such is not really the enemy.  Ideas attributed to antiquity 
are not wrong because they happen to be modern, and in any event 
anachronism is extremely useful in the study of procedure.  Without resorting 
to anachronism, for example, Maine could never have made his famous 
(wholly anachronistic) statement that, in early legal systems, the substantive 
law appears to be "gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."12  
Hoetink, in his influential13 1955 essay on legal historiography,14 draws a 
distinction between good and bad anachronism.  In some respects, he says, we 
are able to know antiquity better than the ancients; we know how the story 
turned out, and our intellectual arsenal is bigger.  To try to stand where the 
ancients stood and observe what the ancients observed means turning our back 
on these considerable advantages.15  On the other hand, if we set out to explain 
events by assigning modern motives or states of mind to the actors, then we 
have strayed into bad anachronism, because we are making spurious 
connections between human actions and the events being explained.16  Thus it 
is perfectly acceptable for Maine to say that early law did not clearly observe 
the modern distinction between substantive and procedural law, but it would 
not have been acceptable for him to assume that the ancients were capable of 
making the modern distinction but, e.g., lacked the desire or opportunity to do 
 
Principles in Roman Law," Fundamina 2 (1996): 108-9, and Wolfgang Waldstein, "Topik und 
Intuition in der römischen Rechtswissenschaft," Festgabe für Arnold Herdlitcza, edd. Franz 
Horak and Wolfgang Waldstein (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1972), 248-49.  Another example, 
argued persuasively by William Turpin in a recent study, is the idea that the cognitio 
procedure was introduced as part of a coherent program of law reform undertaken in early 
imperial Rome, an idea which Turpin attributes in part to Savigny.  William Turpin, 
"Formula, cognitio, and Proceedings extra ordinem," Revue Internationale des Droits de 
l'Antiquité (3rd series) 46 (1999): 501-2. 
12 Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (London: John 
Murray, 1883), 389.  And without resorting to anachronism, Watson could not have argued 
that Maine was wrong.  Alan Watson, "The Law of Actions and the Development of 
Substantive Law in the Early Roman Republic," Law Quarterly Review 89 (1973): 387-92. 
13 Winkel, "The Role of General Principles," 108: "Since Hoetink it has generally been 
accepted that the use of anachronistic concepts is inevitable, but they have to be realised and 
justified."  
14 H. R. Hoetink, "Les Notions Anachroniques dans l'Historiographie du Droit," 
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 23 (1955): 1-20. 
15 Ibid., 7-8. 
16 See ibid., 14, 15-16, and especially 10: "Je crois que pour poser les problèmes les 
notion soi-disant anachroniques sont absolument admissibles, tandis qu'elles ne sont 
certainement pas admissibles quand il s'agit d'expliquer de manière psychologique les actions 
et la conduite des hommes d'autrefois." 
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so. 
My argument below is that the Roman formulary procedure has, in the 
past, attracted the same admiration as Roman private law, and that in 
particular its admirers have used the kind of anachronism Hoetink 
discouraged.  My chief illustration is the use of "principles of procedure," 
developed by German writers of the nineteenth century, and applied by some 
to Roman procedure.  These principles provided a platform for observers to 
admire Roman procedure, but invited them also to admire what could not be 
seen very clearly.  I discuss these principles together with the subject of 
precedent: certain principles of procedure, I argue, contributed to the common 
view that in Roman law a judgment could not be a precedent for a future 
judgment.  But I will first give a short example to illustrate the point. 
Example: Summons 
In the classical law a summons (in ius vocatio) for a lawsuit between persons 
was performed privately: a person would find his opponent or his opponent's 
representative, and bring him before the magistrate.17  This was the law from 
the time of the Twelve Tables.18  But there is a large gap in the evidence; 
Cicero, an important source of procedural law for the late republic, makes only 
a single reference to in ius vocatio.19  At one time, the gap was easily 
explainable on the basis of the rubric to Digest 2.6, which ostensibly preserves 
the praetor's edict on the matter: 
In ius uocati ut eant aut satis uel cautum dent 
That those who are called before the magistrate should go, or provide a surety or an 
undertaking 
If the edict gave the defendant the choice of following immediately or giving 
some sort of promise to appear later, then perhaps (some believed) a plaintiff-
to-be would avoid using the summons, preferring to obtain a promise to 
appear from his opponent.20  This would explain the almost total absence of in 
 
17 See Max Kaser, Das römische Zivilprozessrecht, 2nd ed. rev. Karl Hackl (Munich: 
Beck, 1996), § 30 II. 
18 XII Tab. I, 1-3 (Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 2:584-88). 
19 Cicero, pro Quinctio 61. 
20 See the authorities cited in Ernest Metzger, "The Current View of the Extra-Judicial 
vadimonium," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 117 (2000): 
140-41 nn. 23-25. 
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ius vocatio in Cicero.21  The discovery of Gaius' Institutes, however, forced 
writers to find a new explanation for the absence.  Institutes 4.4622 revealed 
something of the original, uninterpolated condition of the Digest rubric: the 
edict gave an action against a person who, once summoned, neither followed 
nor put forward a representative.  A consensual promise to appear was not an 
option offered in the edict.  Therefore if, in practice, consensual promises did 
indeed push aside summonses, some other explanation would have to be found 
for that practice.  It is here that certain writers brought forward a host of 
'psychological' assumptions to show that Roman litigants preferred to begin 
their lawsuits consensually, and not by means of a summons:23 the defendant 
would prefer to agree on his appearance date, rather than allow himself to be 
seized immediately in the street; the plaintiff would prefer to know when his 
opponent was available, rather than risk missing him; both parties would 
prefer to arrive before the magistrate in a good state of preparation.  Some 
believed also that the educated classes would not have submitted to such an 
archaic procedure as in ius vocatio.24 
 
21 M. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Handbuch des Civilprozesses (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1834), 
1:247; idem, Der römische Civilprozeß (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1865), 2:199.  Much of the 
subsequent literature followed Bethmann-Hollweg's lead, and declared that lawsuits, at least 
up to Cicero's time, were begun consensually rather than by summons.  The literature is cited 
in Metzger, "The Current View," 142-43 n.29, but Kelly can be quoted as an example: 
"Towards the end of the Republic actual in ius vocatio came to be generally replaced, as a 
means of initiating litigation, by vadimonium . . . ; this is the procedure found, for example, in 
all the speeches of Cicero." J. M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 6-
7. 
22 Gaius, Institutes 4.46: Ceterae quoque formulae quae sub titulo DE IN IUS 
VOCANDO propositae sunt, in factum conceptae sunt, velut adversus eum qui in ius vocatus 
neque venerit neque vindicem dederit.  
23 See Giovanni Pugliese, Il Processo Civile Romano (Milan: Giuffrè, 1963), 2:401; 
André Fliniaux, Le Vadimonium (Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1908), 105; Bethmann-Hollweg, 
Der römische Civilprozeß, 2:199. 
24 Fliniaux, Le Vadimonium, 104-5 ("[L']usage se répandit d'abondonner le procédé 
brutal et archaïque de l'in jus vocatio pour assurer la première comparution du défendeur in 
jure à l'aide d'un vadimonium . . . ."), 105 (Nous savons ... qu[e le vadimonium] devint le mode 
de citation usité entre gens de bonne société."); Bethmann-Hollweg, Der römische 
Civilprozeß, 2:199 ("[E]ntsprach [diese neue Einleitungsform des prozesses] mehr als jenes 
überraschende, unhöfliche Antreten auf offener Straße dem Anstandsgefühl der gebildeten 
Classen.").  In the note immediately following, ibid., 199 n.15, Bethmann-Hollweg explains 
the basis of his opinion: "Darüber läßt sich freilich nicht streiten; daß aber die Römer so 
fühlten, beweißt m.E. die Ausschließung der in ius vocatio gegen Respectspersonen schon im 
älteren Recht."  Bethmann-Hollweg has in mind the persons named in Digest 2.4.2, 4 (Ulpian 
5 ed.) and Digest 2.4.3 (Callistratus 1 cog.), e.g., magistrates with imperium, priests 
performing sacred rites, and judges hearing cases.  This is some support for his opinion, 
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These motives or states of mind, though not modern per se, do reflect a 
very modern balance of interests on the litigants' part, a balance they achieve 
by ignoring certain daunting features of Roman procedure.  Roman procedure 
was uniquely ruthless about (1) forcing the appearance of a civil defendant 
before the magistrate, and (2) the legal effect of "joinder of issue" (litis 
contestatio).  A defendant who appeared once before the magistrate could be 
forced to appear again and again25 on penalty of, perhaps, a summary trial by a 
bank of judges, or the sequestration and sale of his property.26  Moreover, his 
only likely exit from this cycle of appearances was joinder of issue, which 
subsumed his prior rights into a single action, limited his defenses, and 
precluded him from raising certain matters in any subsequent suit.27  In short, 
the power lay so much on the plaintiff's side at this stage of the proceedings 
that one wonders why a defendant would necessarily put all worries aside and 
submit to these risks purely for the sake of orderliness.  And yet the "consent 
theory" assumed that so many defendants felt this way that summons by in ius 
vocatio fell out of use. 
The view that in ius vocatio fell out of use, however, is no longer part of 
the common opinion.  The common opinion is that consensual first 
appearances, to the extent they were used, would have required the use of the 
summons as an accompaniment,28 at least in some cases.29  Therefore Cicero's 
 
though it is a leap to infer from this brief list that the better classes of Romans rejected in ius 
vocatio. 
25 The best example is in Cicero, pro Quinctio 22, where the plaintiff Naevius 
repeatedly forces the defendant Quinctius to appear. 
26 That a magistrate might order the parties' reappearance if the matter were not ready 
for his decision is well attested: see Gaius, Institutes 4.184 and the authorities cited in Ernest 
Metzger, "The Case of Petronia Iusta," Revue Internationale des Droits de l'Antiquité 47 
(2000): 159 n.30, 160 n.34.  The penalty for refusing to make the promise, however, is 
uncertain.  A magistrate in Cisalpine Gaul had the power to order a summary trial against a 
person who refused to promise to reappear in Rome, according to a statute from the first 
century BC (lex de Gallia Cisalpina, col. 2, ll. 21-24; see Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 
1:466).  Lenel believes it is possible that, in Rome, the penalty for refusing to promise to 
reappear was the sale of the refusing party's goods.  Otto Lenel, Das Edictum Perpetuum, 3rd 
ed. (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz; reprinted Aalen: Scientia, 1956), 80-81 n.11.  The possible 
contents of the edict are discussed in David Johnston, "Vadimonium, the lex Irnitana, and the 
edictal commentaries," in Quaestiones Iuris, edd. Ulrich Manthe and Christoph Krampe 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 119-20. 
27 See Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, § 42 II. 
28 The change of view was prompted by the discovery of memoranda which record 
promises to appear in a place other than the magistrate's court.  See J. G. Wolf, "Das 
sogenannte Ladungsvadimonium," in Satura Roberto Feenstra, edd. J. A. Ankum, et al. 
(Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1985), 63-65.  Wolf says that in ius 
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virtual silence on in ius vocatio cannot be evidence that consensual first 
appearances replaced summonses.  No doubt some defendants very willingly 
gave promises instead of facing immediate arrest,30 but the idea that Roman 
defendants as a class checked their fears and "took the long view" has no 
support in this argument from silence.   
The discarded view that in ius vocatio fell out of use was not prompted by 
carelessness or blindness to the evidence.  Certain writers simply admired the 
system of Roman litigation and concluded that in ius vocatio was crude and 
archaic and did not really belong.  They then tried to mend the incongruity by 
assigning to the actors motives and states of mind which in the long run could 
not be supported by the evidence.  The result was a picture of Roman 
procedure that was better than it actually was.  This admiration-and-mending I 
illustrate more fully below. 
Case Law? 
Whether the Romans had a system of case law is the kind of anachronistic but 
nonetheless worthwhile question mentioned above.31  The answer, however, is 
probably no.  The formulary procedure itself, by anyone's account, would have 
made any system of case law extremely difficult.32  The formulary procedure 
lasted roughly from the end of the second century BC to the third century AD.  
Forms of action were described precisely, something which gave the law 
 
vocatio probably continued to be used to bring the defendant from the meeting place to the 
magistrate.  Wolf's suggestion is accepted in the newest edition of Kaser: Kaser/Hackl, 
Zivilprozessrecht, 231.  Another possibility is that in ius vocatio was used as a threat to induce 
the making of the promise.  Teresa Giménez-Candela, "Notas en torno al 'uadimonium'," 
Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris 48 (1982): 135, 165. 
29 Duncan Cloud has argued recently that at least some promises were for appearance at 
the court; these would not require the use of in ius vocatio.  Duncan Cloud, "Some Thoughts 
on vadimonium," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 119 
(2002): 159. 
30 See Metzger, "The Current View," 133-78, arguing that this practice is poorly 
supported in the evidence. 
31 In preparing this material the following work was not available to me: U. Vincenti 
(ed.), Il Valore dei Precedenti Giudiziali nella Tradizione Europea (Padova: Cedam, 1998).  
However, based on the summary in Labeo 47 (2001): 451-67, my arguments would not 
change.  
32 There are useful, general discussions of the formulary procedure in David Johnston, 
Roman Law in Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 112-18; Ditlev 
Tamm, Roman Law and European Legal History (Copenhagen: DJØF, 1997), 53-64; F. de 
Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 2:250-54. 
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continuity, but in an individual case the forms could be altered and assembled 
in different ways to create a specific statement of issues.  This altering and 
assembling of forms was performed, however, not by a judge, but by a judicial 
magistrate.  The magistrate drew up the statement of issues and passed them 
on, fully formed, to the judge for resolution.  This division of labor alone must 
have put many opportunities for innovation beyond the judge's reach.  A 
system of case law would be all the more difficult to realize because a 
judgment was oral33 and gave no reasons, and therefore any innovations in the 
judgment would have to be inferred from the issues, the resolution, the legal 
advice taken by the judge, and the like.  Accordingly the common opinion 
says that the decision of a Roman judge did not make law for future 
decisions34 and the common opinion is probably right. 
 Kaser has reviewed the evidence thoroughly and given the strongest 
defense of the common opinion.35  It is clear, he says, that the Romans had a 
different notion of law than our own: they accepted the jurists' law as "law" 
even though it was not a binding pronouncement of the state, and was 
 
33 But see Bruce Frier, The Rise of the Roman Jurists (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1985), 227 ("[Judges] probably also supplied written copies to the litigants.").  
Recorded judgments that survive are rare.  The most outstanding example of such a record 
under the formulary procedure is probably the Tabula Contrebiensis (87 BC) from Botorrita in 
Spain, which recites two formulae and adds a judgment at the end.  See J. S. Richardson, "The 
Tabula Contrebiensis: Roman law in Spain in the Early First Century B.C.," Journal of 
Roman Studies 73 (1983): 34-41; Peter Birks, Alan Rodger, and J. S. Richardson, "Further 
Aspects of the Tabula Contrebiensis," Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984): 45-73.  A second 
outstanding example is a decision on the inheritance of a Roman soldier in Egypt, from 
perhaps A.D. 41 or 42, preserved on papyrus (P. Mich. III 159 = Fontes Iuris Romani 
Antejustiniani, ed. V. Arangio-Ruiz (Florence: S. A. G. Barbèra, 1969), vol. 3, no. 64).  This 
decision does not actually preserve the aspect of a Roman formula (though the beginning 
mimics a demonstratio; see Gaius, Institutes 4.40), but it does use some of the technical 
language of the formulary procedure.  See Paul M. Meyer and Ernst Levy, "Sententia des 
iudex datus in einem Erbrechtsprozeß unter Claudius," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 46 (1926): 283-85, who also suggest the dates, ibid., 278. 
34 See, e.g., Mario Talamanca, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano (Milan: Giuffrè, 1990), 23; 
Frier, Roman Jurists, 229-31; Alan Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 171-72; John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Law School, 1968), 100-107; W. W. Buckland and Arnold D. 
McNair, Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparison in Outline, 2nd ed. rev. F. H. Lawson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 6-10; Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal 
Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 92. 
35 Max Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle im römischen Recht," in Festschrift Fritz 
Schwind, edd. R. Strasser, et al. (Vienna: Manzsche Verlags- und Universitätsbuchhandlung, 
1978), 115-30 (= Max Kaser, Römische Rechtsquellen und angewandte Juristenmethode 
(Vienna: Böhlau, 1986), 42-64). 
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frequently ambiguous.  They might have extended the same treatment to 
judges' decisions, but the evidence suggests they did not.36  Various authorities 
describe the sources of law: the juristic writers37 do not mention the decisions 
of judges at all, and the rhetorical writers, where they include the decisions of 
judges, mean only that a decision might be a source of a right (like a 
contract),38 that it might "make law" for a later decision in the same dispute,39 
or that it might serve as evidence of the law for an unrelated but legally similar 
case.40 
 These are the authorities that bear directly on the question, but a review of 
the history of Roman lawmaking, according to Kaser, gives the same answer: 
that the decisions of judges had no greater force than as evidence of the law.41  
For a time the college of pontifices had a monopoly on declaring what the law 
was,42 a monopoly that ensured that the law was consistent and that the judge 
could not depart from the advice he was given.43  When the competence to 
declare the law passed to the jurists, it was possible for differences of opinion 
about the law to arise.  We might think that judges would then have had the 
freedom to contribute to the law through their decisions, but Kaser says they 
were no more capable of making law than before.44 
Knowledge of the law nevertheless remained the preserve of the now freed community of 
 
36 Ibid., 118-19. 
37 Gaius, Institutes 1.2: Constant autem iura populi Romani ex legibus, plebiscitis, 
senatusconsultis, constitutionibus principum, edictis eorum qui ius edicendi habent, responsis 
prudentium.  A similar list is given in Digest 1.1.7 (Papinian 2 def.) and Justinian, Institutes 
1.2.3. 
38 Cicero, de Inventione 2.22.68; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 7.4.6. 
39 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 5.2.1. 
40 Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle," 118-21.  On the last item perhaps the clearest 
sources are Rhetorica ad Herennium 2.13.19 (which notes that decisions inevitably conflict, 
and suggests how advocates can make the best of the decisions they have) and Quintilian, 
Institutio Oratoria 5.2.1 (who includes in his definition of praeiudicium judgments which are 
said to serve as exempla in other cases).  Kaser says this use of judgments as "evidence for the 
state of the law" might be regarded as a "source of law," but notes that no jurist makes this 
characterization.  Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle," 121.  Other rhetorical sources which 
allude to judgments as evidence of the law are cited in Frier, Roman Jurists, 129 n.102.  
Advocates themselves may have regarded prior cases as something more than evidence of the 
law: see ibid., 229.  On this point see also notes 148 to 150 below and accompanying text.    
41 Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle," 124-28. 
42 See Digest 1.2.2.6 (Pomponius ench.). 
43 Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle," 125-26. 
44 Ibid., 126: "Dennoch bleibt die Rechtskennerschaft das Reservat der nunmehr freien 
Juristenzunft, weil die Gerichtsmagistrate ebenso wie die Urteilsrichter nach wie vor der 
juristischen Fachbildung entbehren." 
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jurists, because the judicial magistrates and judges alike lacked, as before, the specialist 
juristic training. 
Juristic training, according to Kaser, elevated the value of expert advice.  It 
meant that a jurist could be interested in a judgment only insofar as it favored 
or contradicted a professional legal opinion.  The opinion of a lay judge might 
interest others, but to a jurist it meant nothing.45 
How the particular case turned out . . . leaves him cold, because he knows that judgments 
are given by laymen whose sometimes irrelevant opinion he is indifferent to.  The jurist 
writes for those who are like himself, and for his professional successors.  In this respect 
Roman jurisprudence is an esoteric science, which decides for itself whose contributions 
to value, and which passes over lay opinion—indeed, even the opinion of an elementary 
teacher of law like Gaius—in silence.46 
Kaser's argument is a careful and balanced one.  He does not ask whether a 
judge's decision was binding in the way a modern judge's decision is, which 
would hold decisions to a higher standard than jurists' law.47  He also 
acknowledges the popular force of a judge's decision—a very public 
pronouncement of a state-appointed officer48—and defends the case-based 
nature of jurists' law against the claim that the jurists were engaged in system-
building.49  But his argument is nevertheless a very particular one: he asks and 
 
45 Ibid., 126-27.  Similarly, Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 24. 
46 Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle," 127: 
Wie der konkrete Prozeß ausgegangen ist . . . läßt ihn kalt; denn er weiß, daß die Urteile 
von Laien gefällt werden, deren zuweilen unsachgemäße Meinung ihm gleichgultig ist.  
Der Jurist schreibt für seinesgleichen und für den Nachwuchs in seiner Zunft.  Damit 
bleibt die römische Jurisprudenz eine esoterische Wissenschaft, die selbst entscheidet, 
wessen Leistung sie gelten läßt, und die die Laienmeinung, ja sogar die eines juristischen 
Elementarlehrers wie Gaius, schweigend übergeht. 
47 For a summary of views on the ius respondendi, which may have given special force 
to the opinions of some jurists, see G. MacCormack, "Sources," in A Companion to Justinian's 
Institutes, ed. Ernest Metzger (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 11-14. 
48 Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle," 127. 
49 Ibid., 122-24, contra O. Behrends, "Die Causae Coniectio der Zwölftafeln und die 
Tatbestandsdisposition der Gerichtsrhetorik," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 92 (1975): 171.  See also Schulz, Roman Legal Science, 24 
("[The jurists'] principle was to wait till the case occurred, and to feel their way from case to 
case.").  Cf. O. E. Tellegen-Couperus, "The Role of the Judge in the Formulary Procedure," 
Journal of Legal History 22/2 (2001): 2 ("According to prevailing doctrine . . . Justinian's 
Digest does not reflect the legal practice of the classical period but a scientific, theoretical 
kind of literature that was at most inspired in terms of style and content by the questions that 
were submitted to the jurists in practice.").   
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answers the question whether a Roman judge participated in Rechtsfindung,50 
that is, in the kind of intellectual activity remitted to the jurists from the 
pontifices.  We might be satisfied with Kaser's argument that they did not, but 
still wonder whether, as a matter of empirical fact, judges ever relied on past 
decisions which innovated in some way, and which were therefore more than 
"evidence of the law."  We could call this "precedent," even if such decisions 
were never binding, were ignored by the experts, and left nothing obvious 
behind in the Digest.51 
 This is more or less the kind of precedent which Jolowicz argues did exist 
for a time in Rome.52  What he has in mind is not a body of case law with the 
same intellectual pretensions as jurists' law, nor of course binding law, but 
simply a practice among judges of following and citing prior decisions.  This 
practice, he suggests, existed until the late republic, when jurists began truly to 
command the scene and could give judges better support than prior decisions 
could.53  Before that time, "precedent . . . undoubtedly played a part in the 
development of the law."54 
 
50 Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle," 115: "[D]rängt sich . . . dem angelsächsischen 
Romanisten die Frage auf, ob nicht auch die Römer, mindestens in gewissen Grenzen, das 
Urteil als Mittel der Rechtsfindung anerkannt haben, und gegebenfalls, weshalb sie dabei so 
zurückhaltend verfahren sind.  Diesen bisher nur wenig untersuchten Fragen wollen wir im 
folgenden nachgehen." 
51 Honoré, writing on jurists' law: 
The doctrine that precedents are binding is not an essential feature of a system based on 
precedent. . . .  What is necessary for a system of precedent is that arguments from 
example should be admissible in the sense that an appeal to a previous instance or 
example is an adequate justification for a decision, not necessarily that it compels 
decision. 
A. M. Honoré, "Legal Reasoning: Rome and Today," South African Law Journal 91 
(1974): 89-90. 
52 H. F. Jolowicz, "Case Law in Roman Egypt," Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law 14 (1937): 1-15.  Jolowicz reviews some of his arguments in idem, 
"Precedent in Greek and Roman Law," Bullettino dell' Istituto di Diritto Romano 46 (1939): 
394-405; idem, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. J. A. Jolowicz (London: Athlone, 1963), 220-
23; H. F. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3rd 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 354 n.4. 
53 Jolowicz, "Case Law," 15. 
54 Jolowicz and Nicholas, Historical Introduction, 354 n.4.  Jolowicz later used stronger 
language for this important conclusion.  In the second edition of the Historical Introduction, 
he said somewhat equivocally that precedent played "some" part.  H. F. Jolowicz, Historical 
Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1954), 569 (Appendix to 365 n.2).  The edition which followed appeared after Jolowicz's 
death, and was edited by Barry Nicholas.  Nicholas possibly amended "some part" to "a part" 
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 Jolowicz's argument is based almost wholly on inference.  He relies on 
reports of judicial proceedings from Roman Egypt.  The reports are extracts 
from official diaries, sometimes perhaps made as evidence of rights, but 
sometimes also as authorities for legal propositions.55  The latter Jolowicz 
deduces from the fact that collections of reports on particular points of law 
have survived56 and that certain petitions and judgments cited and relied on 
these reports as authority.57  He sums up this part of his argument:58 
One may say then that there existed [in Roman Egypt] a definite practice of citing decided 
cases as authority in courts of law, that judgments were sometimes expressly based on 
such authority, and that the practice was facilitated by the use of official diaries and 
collections made from the reports that they contained.  But it is unlikely that there was 
much in the way of a theory of case law, though it was no doubt clear that judgments had 
to give way to "laws," including especially imperial enactments of any sort, and quite 
possibly some idea that a judge need not consider too carefully the decision of one whose 
rank was inferior to his own.  In particular there is no reason to suppose that case law was 
justified as a species of customary law. 
The nub of Jolowicz's argument, however, is the inference he asks us to draw 
 
in light of Jolowicz's very strong statement, published in 1963: "[I]t is clear that the influence 
of actual decisions in the development of the law was at all times considerable."  Jolowicz, 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, 223. 
55 Jolowicz, "Case Law," 5. 
56 Ibid., 5-7. 
57 Ibid., 7-10. 
58 Ibid., 12.  Jolowicz's interpretation of the papyrological evidence is bolder than that 
of Weiß, who had treated most of the same material 25 years earlier.  E. Weiß, "Recitatio und 
Responsum im römischen Provinzialprozeß, ein Beitrag zum Gerichtsgebrauch," Zeitschrift 
der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 33 (1912): 212-39.  Weiss saw the 
papyri as confirmation that, in provincial practice, a series of decisions might reveal local 
customary law, as suggested in Digest 1.3.34 (Ulpian 4 off. pro.) and Code 8.52.1 (AD 224).  
Ibid., 227-32.  Jolowicz goes further than this, arguing that decisions were made on the 
authority of prior judgments—even single judgments—and not necessarily on the authority of 
any custom revealed in the judgments.  Katzoff has treated the same material more recently, 
and agrees with Jolowicz that decisions were sometimes based on prior judgments.  R. 
Katzoff, "Precedents in the Courts of Roman Egypt," Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für 
Rechtsgeschichte (rom. Abt.) 89 (1972): 290 ("We can definitely assert that judges did 
occasionally base their decisions on the precedents cited to them.").  On the other hand, 
Katzoff does not assert, as Jolowicz does, that decisions in Egypt were a source of law, but 
says only that they were "acceptable evidence of the law."  Ibid., 291.  Kaser cites Katzoff and 
Weiß with approval, but one wonders whether Jolowicz's article was available to him: 
"[Katzoff] nimmt mit Jolowicz an, daß die ägyptischen Precedents nicht so sehr 
Rechtsentstehungs- als vielmehr Rechtserkenntnisquellen waren, also Informationsmittel von 
der Art, wie sie von der römischen Rhetorik verstanden wurden."  Kaser, "Das Urteil als 
Rechtsquelle," 128 n.63.  This is not Jolowicz's view, as the quotation above makes clear. 
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from the dates.59  The collections of decisions, and petitions and decisions 
which cite earlier decisions, date from the late first century to the middle of 
the third: "The period for which we have evidence," Jolowicz says, "thus 
corresponds not too badly to that of the classical Roman law,"60 by which he 
means post-republican law.  The common opinion regards the practice of 
citing and following cases to be provincial only,61 but Jolowicz does not 
believe the practice is Greek, nor is it attested in Ptolemaic Egypt, and this 
suggests to him that it originated in Rome.62  He finds support for this 
inference in a study which (he accepts) gives several examples in which 
judges from republican Rome established precedents.63  He concludes:64 
It is possible that the growth of [jurists'] responsa in the early Empire caused less 
attention to be paid to precedents at Rome, but the annexation of Egypt comes at the end 
of the Republic, and republican practice is thus sufficient to explain the development in 
that country of a system which appears to be thoroughly in keeping with the practical 
genius of Roman administration. 
Accordingly what Jolowicz is suggesting is that to some unknown (and 
probably unknowable) extent, precedent existed in republican Rome.  He does 
not suggest that anything like a system of case law existed, or that judges ever 
made law.  The precedential force he attributes to the decisions of judges is 
similar to the precedential force Honoré attributes to jurists' law:65 some 
judges found justification for their decisions in the examples which previous 
decisions furnished. 
For present purposes I assume that Jolowicz's conclusion is at least 
plausible.  What I wish to point out is that the common opinion, rejecting the 
existence of "case law," would not necessarily reject the existence of this kind 
of precedent.  Kaser, defending the common opinion, denies the existence of 
 
59 On what follows, see Jolowicz, "Case Law," 12-15. 
60 Ibid., 12. 
61 See note 58 above. 
62 Jolowicz, "Case Law," 12-15.  Similarly, in his address to the Riccobono Seminar: "It 
is difficult to believe that a system of quoting precedents would have arisen in Egypt if it had 
been contrary to Roman ideas about the administration of justice.  There was, as I have tried to 
show, nothing in classical Greece out of which such a system could have arisen.  There is no 
reason to believe that the native Egyptians had anything of the sort."  Jolowicz, "Precedent," 
404. 
63 Jolowicz, "Case Law," 15.  See P. Collinet, "Le rôle des juges dans la formation du 
droit romain classique," in Recueil d'études sur les sources du droit: en l'honneur de François 
Gény (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1934), 23-31. 
64 Jolowicz, "Case Law," 15. 
65 Note 51 above. 
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case law because the sources deny its existence and because the judge's office 
was incapable of creating what the Roman jurists (and therefore we) would 
regard as law.  Jolowicz's claim is too modest to worry the common opinion 
on these points.66  He does not argue for the existence of "case law," and to the 
contrary makes no assumptions about the quality or content of any precedent.  
In fact nothing in his notion of precedent would bar a judge from following a 
prior decision for any foolish reason.  He does broadly conclude that judges 
must have contributed to the development of the law more than is usually 
appreciated, but on his explanation these contributions would have been 
incidental (because there was no theory of case law) and limited in time 
(because the jurists eventually met the need).  The hegemony of jurists' law is 
indeed something on which both Jolowicz and the common opinion agree, 
Jolowicz speculating only that there was a time when the hegemony did not 
exist and judges looked to one another for support.67  This is the only 
concession his explanation requires of the common opinion. 
 Jolowicz's is among a handful of explanations that claim that judges 
contributed to the development of the law to some degree.68  It is worth asking 
why these explanations have received very little attention.69  This is the 
principal subject of a recent study by Tellegen-Couperus: she asks why the 
common opinion has neglected the role of judgments in the development of 
the law, and recites arguments (quite different from those of Jolowicz) in favor 
of such a role.70  She suggests that the common opinion resisting such 
 
66 Kaser unfortunately does not give his opinion of Jolowicz's conclusion.  See note 58 
above. 
67 Jolowicz's suggestion is therefore significant primarily for what it suggests about the 
development of jurists' law, and less significant for anything it might say about the character 
of that law.  Cf. the conclusion of Tellegen-Couperus, "The Role of the Judge," 5, quoted 
below, note 70. 
68 I would include here Collinet, "Le rôle des juges"; Tellegen-Couperus, "The Role of 
the Judge" (whose argument is described below, note 70); Dawson, The Oracles of the Law, 
104.  
69 Of course, the explanations may simply be wrong, whence the lack of attention.  Yet 
Schiller called Jolowicz's study "brilliant," and was generally enthusiastic about its 
conclusions; he noted that it had not provoked any discussion.  A. Arthur Schiller, Roman 
Law: Mechanisms of Development (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), 267-68.  He also seems to cite 
part of Collinet's study with approval.  Ibid., 267 n.11.  Katzoff, writing after Schiller and with 
Schiller's encouragement, accepts Jolowicz's general conclusion, but so far as I am aware he is 
the only one to do so.  Katzoff, "Precedents," 291-92. 
70 Tellegen-Couperus, "The Role of the Judge," 1-13.  Her thesis is not that a judge's 
decision was ever a formal source of law, but only that judges contributed to the development 
of the law to a greater degree than is commonly appreciated.  They did so, she says, through 
the jurists, who would use judicial decisions which they thought were important for the 
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arguments is based on two assumptions that are mistaken.71 
 The first is the mistaken assumption that the judge decided on facts alone, 
and that questions of law were left to magistrates and jurists.72  If this 
assumption had ever taken hold, it is easy to see how the common opinion 
would have passed over arguments like Jolowicz's: a decision on the facts 
leaves very little for a subsequent judge to rely on, even when the influence of 
jurists is absent.  But did it take hold?  There are echoes of it in Savigny's 
Historical School which, as Whitman points out, interpreted Roman sources in 
a way hostile to the idea of precedent.73  In particular Puchta, Savigny's 
successor, played down the authority of precedent in Rome by emphasizing 
the different roles of judge and jurist.74  Puchta made it clear, however, that 
the fact/law distinction was wrong:75 
 
development of the law, and in which they themselves had played a role (either as advisers or 
indeed as judges), and incorporate them into their collections of responsa.  Therefore, "the 
texts of the Roman jurists, which have been compiled in Justinian's Digest, must to a large 
extent consist of responsa which are closely linked to legal practice in general and to case law 
in particular."  Ibid., 5.  Tellegen-Couperus' argument is bolder than Jolowicz's because it 
links decisions directly to the writings of the jurists.  She therefore confronts the common 
opinion on its own terms, asserting that decisions were indeed contributing content to jurists' 
law.  Jolowicz, in contrast, more or less leaves it up to the reader to speculate by what means 
precedent played a role in the development of the law.  What distinguishes Tellegen-Couperus 
view from the usual view of responsa is in her suggestion that the jurists (to some degree) 
took their cue from the judges, and not the other way around.  Compare Schulz, Roman Legal 
Science, 224-25; J. M. Kelly, Studies in the Civil Judicature of the Roman Republic (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976), 75-76.  
71 Tellegen-Couperus, "The Role of the Judge," 1-2, writes of "three assumptions," but 
the third assumption (that judgments were irrelevant to the development of the law) is 
intended to follow from the first two.  
72 Ibid., 2-3. 
73 J. Q. Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic Era (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 130. 
74 Ibid. 
75 G. F. Puchta, Cursus der Institutionen. [Geschichte des Rechts bei dem römischen 
Volk, vol. 1], 9th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1881), 435: 
Es wäre . . . ein Irrthum, wenn man die römischen Judices mit den heutigen Geschwornen 
vergleichen, und sich vorstellen wollte, sie seien bloß mit der Untersuchung des 
Factischen beschäftig gewesen, die Rechtssätze seien ihnen durch das Verfahren in iure 
vorgezeichnet worden. . . .  Der Magistrat entschied allerdings über die allgemeine 
rechtliche Begründung des Anspruchs, indem er die Klagen und Einreden zuließ, und das 
Iudicium ordnete, aber selbst bei der allereinfachsten Klage, der auf eine bestimmte 
geschuldete Geldsumme, konnte sich noch mancher Anlaß zu rechtlichen Fragen im 
Iudicium finden, noch mehr war dieß der Fall bei den Klagen, in welchen durch die 
Anweisung, zu untersuchen, was eine Partei der andern ex fide bona zu leisten habe, dem 
Richter ein weites Feld rechtlicher Erwägungen geöffnet war, und eben so bei dinglichen 
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If one wanted to compare Roman judges with today's jury it would be a mistake to 
imagine that the former were concerned only with the investigation of facts, that the legal 
points had been determined for them during the proceedings in iure. . . .  The magistrate 
indeed decided the general legal basis to the claim in the course of allowing the actions 
and exceptions and ordering the trial, but even in the most simple action, one for a 
specific sum of money owed, there could be occasion for legal questions to arise in the 
trial, and this was even more the case in actions in which the judge, instructed to enquire 
what one party ought to do for the other in good faith, is given wide scope for legal 
considerations, and this is the case even in real actions (e.g., rei vindicatio), where the 
judge is only generally instructed to enquire whether the plaintiff is the owner, and where 
therefore the entire body of law on individual modes of acquisition could come up for 
consideration. 
Many others subsequently expressed the same view,76 and in fact it is difficult 
to find writers who maintain the opposite.77 
 The second mistaken assumption Tellegen-Couperus cites is the 
assumption that judges were lay persons without legal knowledge.78  On this 
assumption, she argues, the common opinion has rejected judgments as 
irrelevant to the development of the law, even though there are reasons to 
believe some judges had good knowledge of the law.79  This assumption is 
closer to the mark: we have seen it above.  Kaser (representing the common 
opinion) does argue that judges lacked juristic training and that as a result 
jurists were not inclined to take their judgments seriously.80  The problem here 
 
Klagen, z. B. der rei vindicatio, wo der Richter nur im allgemeinen angewiesen war, zu 
untersuchen, ob der Kläger Eigenthümer sei, wo also die ganze Rechtstheorie der 
einzelnen Erwerbsarten in Frage kommen konnte. 
76 See F. Wieacker, Römische Rechtsgeschichte (Munich: Beck, 1988), 1:667; Dawson, 
The Oracles of the Law, 104; Buckland and McNair, Roman Law, 402; Édouard Cuq, Les 
Institutions Juridique des Romains (Paris: Plon, 1902), 1:758-59; J. Baron, Institutionen und 
Civilprozeß [Geschichte des römischen Rechts, vol. 1] (Berlin: Leonhard Simion, 1884), 354; 
Lord Mackenzie [Thomas MacKenzie], Studies in Roman Law, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: William 
Blackwood and Sons, 1876), 340.  Cf. Tellegen-Couperus, "The Role of the Judge," 11 n.2. 
77 See P. Colquhoun, A Summary of the Roman Civil Law (London: William Benning & 
Co., 1849), 1:34 (The judge "judged principally of facts," but points of law must have arisen 
also). 
78 Tellegen-Couperus, "The Role of the Judge," 1, 3-4.  A fairly clear statement of this 
assumption is in Buckland and McNair: "In a system in which the iudex was not a lawyer, but 
a private citizen, little more than an arbitrator, it would be impossible for his judgements to 
bind."  Buckland and McNair, Roman Law, 6.  Compare J. A. Crook, Legal Advocacy in the 
Roman World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 175 n.18 ("The claim . . . that unus 
iudex was not a lawyer needs re-phrasing: say, rather, he did not have to be, and there were no 
career judges."). 
79 Tellegen-Couperus, "The Role of the Judge," 3-4. 
80 Note 46 above and accompanying text. 
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is less with the assumption than with the argument.  By disproving the 
assumptions underlying the common opinion, Tellegen-Couperus hopes to 
disprove the common opinion.  But disproving this assumption does not help 
the cause: individual judges might be well versed in the law, but as a rule 
jurists still cite other jurists, not judgments.81  More important for present 
purposes, this assumption would not explain why "precedent" in Jolowicz's 
very limited sense has gone mostly undiscussed: one might assume that all 
judges were laypersons, but still accept that a judge could rely on an earlier 
judgment, even if his understanding of it were superficial.  
 The common opinion, I have suggested, is essentially right, but the 
common opinion does not logically exclude a theory of precedent like 
Jolowicz's.  That the common opinion does not acknowledge this kind of 
precedent can be attributed, not to the assumptions just discussed, but to 
certain ideas found in some of the older literature.  There the judge is not 
limited to deciding facts or disparaged for his ignorance of law, but plays a 
genuinely important part in the formulary procedure.  He does not make law, 
but his duties complement the law.  His role is a very special and admired one, 
but: it is a role in which paying any attention to other judgments would make 
no sense. 
Principles of Procedure 
In the passage quoted above Puchta discourages his readers from confusing 
the ancient judge with the modern jury.  For his time, this was useful advice.  
The Roman formulary procedure had disappeared by the third century AD and 
had no obvious historical continuity with modern German procedure.  But the 
formulary procedure was attractive to some who contributed to the literature 
on procedure in the nineteenth century,82 and discussions of procedure 
therefore sometimes invited comparisons between the modern and the ancient 
judge.  This attraction to the formulary procedure began with the Historical 
School:83 
 
81 Kaser, "Das Urteil als Rechtsquelle," 127. 
82 Arthur Engelmann, "Modern Continental Procedure," in A History of Continental 
Civil Procedure, edd. Arthur Engelmann, et al. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1927; reprinted 
New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), 598, 606.  As in private law, both romanists and 
germanists were among the writers on procedure, and a rivalry existed.  See K. N. Nörr, 
"Wissenschaft und Schriftum zum deutschen Zivilprozeß im 19. Jahrhundert," in Iudicium est 
actus trium personarum: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Zivilprozeßrechts in Europa (Goldbach: 
Keip, 1993), 147-49. 
83 Engelmann, "Modern Continental Procedure," 543.  
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In a much greater degree [than by the natural law school] was procedural science 
forwarded by the historical school.  Unlike the natural law school, this started with the 
rules of positive law and traced them back to their original sources.  It showed that the 
law of Germany was compounded of Roman, canonical, and Germanic elements and 
sought to reconstruct these elements in all their distinctness. . . .  A notable impetus was 
given to this movement by the discovery of the Gaian manuscript in 1816.  Now, for the 
first time, was made possible a thorough understanding of the Roman civil procedure and, 
especially, the formulary system.  And, contemporaneously, under the influence of the re-
awakened national consciousness, there came about an understanding and correct 
appreciation of the original German law.  
The discovery of Gaius' Institutes was fortunate.  Even though the formulary 
procedure was not in full flower at the time he wrote, Gaius had a law 
teacher's interest in setting out its details, and the Institutes was rich in new 
information.84  In the decades following its discovery, writers on procedure 
beginning with Bethmann-Hollweg, a disciple of  Savigny, undertook to study 
the relationship between the German common-law procedure and all its 
antecedents, including the formulary procedure.85  The works produced by 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Keller, Heffter,86 and others combined history and 
dogma, relying to a high degree on Roman law.87 
 An important vehicle for comparisons between ancient and modern 
procedure were the so-called "principles of procedure" which, generally 
speaking, were a set of specific, observable qualities which were inherent in a 
given system of procedure.  German legal science has been the most energetic 
in the development of these principles.  Millar, writing in 1923, says:88 
Not the least of the contributions for which theoretical study is indebted to German 
 
84 Book Four of Gaius' Institutes was particularly helpful on the archaic legis actio 
procedure (4.11-29), the contents of the formula (4.39-68), and the bringing of a lawsuit 
(4.183-187). 
85 Giuseppe Chiovenda, "Roman and Germanic Elements in Continental Civil 
Procedure," in A History of Continental Civil Procedure, edd. Arthur Engelmann, et al. 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1927; reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), 878-79.  
Bethmann-Hollweg's research program is summarized in Nörr, "Wissenschaft und Schriftum," 
144-46. 
86 The most famous are A. W. Heffter, Institutionen des römischen und teutschen Civil-
Processes (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1825); F. von Keller, Der römische Civilprocess und die 
Actionen (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1852)(substantially revised and corrected by A. Wach 
for the sixth edition, 1883); and M. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Der Civilprozeß des gemeinen 
Rechts in geschichtlicher Entwicklung (Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1864-74), 6 vols. 
87 Nörr, "Wissenschaft und Schriftum," 146, 148-49. 
88 R. W. Millar, "The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure," in A History of 
Continental Civil Procedure, edd. Arthur Engelmann, et al. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 
1927; reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), 5-6. 
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procedural science are certain generalizations which it has made concerning procedural 
method.  By such generalizations it has identified and delimited the fundamental 
conceptions which consciously or unconsciously determine the form and character of 
systems of procedure. 
For example, a given system of procedure may observe the principle that the 
parties and not the judge are responsible for determining what materials the 
judge will rely on in settling the controversy, the so-called 
Verhandlungsmaxime ("the principle of party presentation").89  The system 
might also insist that both sides be heard (Grundsatz des beiderseitigen 
Gehörs: "principle of bilateral hearing") or that proceedings be open even to 
those who are not directly interested in the outcome (Grundsatz der 
Öffentlichkeit: "principle of publicity").  These principles are less often 
discussed among Anglo-American lawyers than continental lawyers,90 but no 
Anglo-American lawyer should doubt how useful they are whenever civil 
procedure needs reform.91  In particular, when German speaking peoples were 
trying to codify a common civil procedure out of the different practices of the 
territorial and imperial courts, the act of identifying and refining principles of 
procedure was essential.  The drafters of the Deutsche Zivilprozessordnung 
(1877) were able to identify and reject a principle which required the parties to 
present all possible issues at the outset (Eventualmaxime), a principle which 
tended to inflate the number of issues in dispute.  But they were also able to 
identify and embrace the principle of orality (Grundsatz der Mündlichkeit), 
which lessened the complexity and secrecy of a procedure dominated by 
writing.92  
 
89 Millar, "Formative Principles," 11-21; R. C. van Caenegem, History of European 
Civil Procedure [International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 16, ch. 2] (Tübingen: 
Mohr, 1973), 14; Anke Freckmann and Thomas Wegerich, The German Legal System 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 142. 
90 Millar, "Formative Principles," 5.  But see William B. Fisch, "The Influence of 
German Civil Procedural Thinking and of the ZPO in the United States," in Das Deutsche 
Zivilprozessrecht und seine Ausstrahlung auf andere Rechtsordnungen, edd. W. Habscheid, et 
al. (Bielefeld: Gieseking, 1991), 400-415. 
91 A good illustration of this is a joint project between UNIDROIT in Rome and the 
American Law Institute to harmonize procedural law at an international level, principally for 
trade matters.  See Conference on the ALI-UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational 
Civil Procedure (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002). 
92 Van Caenegem, History, 93.  Another example, from several decades earlier: when 
leading a ministry for the reform of Prussian laws in 1845, Savigny had prepared a set of 
discussion points for the reform of Prussian civil procedure.  The "eighteen questions of 
principles" all draw on well-developed ideas.  K. W. Nörr, "Die 18 Prinzipienfragen des 
Ministers Savigny zur Reform des preussischen Zivilprozesses," in Iudicium est actus trium 
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Are the principles useful to historians of Roman law?  There is of course 
nothing wrong in claiming that the Romans observed certain principles in their 
procedure, regardless of whether they actually discussed them.  For example 
Kaser, in his textbook (the leading one) on Roman procedure, puts the 
principles together at the opening as a kind of summary.93  Even if the 
principles are a purely modern creation, they provide a means of describing 
Roman procedure as a whole; Kaser of course does not claim they are 
followed consistently.  Wenger, in his own (earlier) leading textbook, also 
uses the principles as a means of description, though he has a different 
approach than Kaser, omitting a general summary of principles and instead 
citing the principles as the need arises, as in this example:94 
The judge must hear both sides, if they or their representatives are ready to engage.  Each 
side must therefore be given the opportunity to speak.  That alone is signified by what 
today we call the principle of bilateral hearing, although this principle was never so 
distinct that the judge could give judgment only when both sides had actually spoken.  
Wenger is speaking to a reader already familiar with the principle, and telling 
him that he may observe it (or some of it) in this aspect of Roman procedure.95  
Both Kaser and Wenger illustrate what Hoetink, discussed above,96 approved 
as a good use of anachronism.  That the Romans themselves did not speak of 
an idea does not mean we cannot profitably observe the idea in Roman 
procedure and give our own name to it.97 
 
personarum: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Zivilprozeßrechts in Europa (Goldbach: Keip, 
1993), 181-85.    
93 Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 8-11. 
94 L. Wenger, Institutionen des römischen Zivilprozessrechts (Munich: 
Hochschulbuchhandlung Max Hueber, 1925), 184: 
Der Richter muß beide Teile hören, wenn diese oder ihre Patrone zu Vorträgen bereit 
sind.  Es muß also jedem Teil die Möglichkeit gegeben sein, sich zu äußern.  Das allein 
besagt der heute sog. Grundsatz des beiderseitigen Gehörs, nicht aber darf dieser 
Grundsatz etwa so gedeutet werden, daß der Richter nur urteilen dürfe, wenn sich beide 
Teile wirklich geäußert haben. 
95 Elsewhere Wenger discusses whether the "Dispositionsmaxime" (the principle that a 
party has control over his own rights) or the "Offizialmaxime" (the principle that an official 
has control over the parties' rights) governed a Roman private lawsuit.  Leopold Wenger, 
"Wandlungen im römischen Zivilprozessrecht," in Festschrift für Gustav Hanausek (Graz: 
Ulrich Mosers, n.d.), 11-22.  His approach is the same as discussed above.  For descriptions of 
these principles see Millar, "Formative Principles," 14-17; van Caenegem, History, 14. 
96 Notes 13 to 16 and accompanying text. 
97 There is perhaps some danger in using the principles as a descriptive "shorthand."  
Asser cites Kaser for the proposition that the principle of bilateral hearing is one of the 
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What makes a historian hesitate of course is the overtly historicist claim 
that the study of Roman procedure is to some degree the study of the original 
German law,98 coupled with the claim that certain principles "unconsciously" 
determined Roman procedure.99  These claims threaten to introduce what 
Hoetink warned was the bad use of anachronism, at least so far as they purport 
to explain causally the existence of rules and institutions by modern motives 
or states of mind.  An example arises under the principle of orality.  This 
principle, as just mentioned, regards it as a virtue for certain aspects of a 
system of procedure—particularly the parties' presentations to a tribunal—to 
be oral rather than written.100  Kaser says very generally that Roman procedure 
was characterized by the principle of orality during all its historical phases.101  
But Seidl, in making the same point, goes on to describe the various 
advantages which modern doctrine attributes to the principle of orality, and 
which the Romans supposedly gained by observing it.102  The reader is left 
 
principles the Romans "adhered strictly to" in the formulary procedure.  Daan Asser, "Audi et 
alterem partem: A Limit to Judicial Activity," in The Roman Law Tradition, edd. A. D. E. 
Lewis and D. J. Ibbetson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 209 n.4.  Asser is 
not to be criticized in this respect, because it was not his aim to set out the Roman law on 
bilaterality, but the proposition is nevertheless misleading.  The procedure itself is indeed 
bilateral, but litigation collateral to the main action might be one-sided.  For example, an 
interdict might be granted against someone who was absent, see Digest 43.29.3.14 (Labeo, in 
Ulpian 71 ed.); and the possession and sale of one's goods might be taken against one who 
concealed himself fraudulently from proceedings, see Digest 42.4.7.1 (Ulpian 59 ed.). 
98 See the quotation accompanying note 83 above.  In certain modern textbooks of 
Roman procedure one finds references to the continuity of these principles into modern law, 
but whether these are genuinely historicist claims or only shadows of them is not clear to me.  
See Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 8 ("Den Prinzipien, deren Einhaltung man von den 
neuzeitlichen Prozeßordnungen fordert, gehorcht zwar zu einem großen Teil das klassische, 
aber nur zu einem geringeren das nachklassische Prozeßrecht."); Erwin Seidl, Römische 
Rechtsgeschichte und römische Zivilprozessrecht (Cologne: Carl Heymann, 1962), 162 (The 
more the State takes over the administration of justice, the greater is the development of 
"Maximen, die auch noch das geltende Prozeßrecht beherrschen.").  Similarly: Erwin Seidl, 
Rechtsgeschichte Ägyptens als römischer Provinz (Saint Augustine: Hans Richarz, 1973), 
110-14. 
99 See the quotation accompanying note 88 above.  See also Kaser/Hackl, 
Zivilprozessrecht, 359: ". . . Prozeßprinzipien . . . die die Römer vielleicht nur deshalb nicht 
formuliert haben, weil sie sie als Voraussetzungen einer sachgemäßen Rechtspflege für 
selbstverständlich hielten."   
100 Millar, "Formative Principles," 49-62.  For a description of the virtues of this 
principle in modern German procedure, see Gerhard Lüke and Alfred Walchshöfer, 
Münchener Kommentar zur Zivilprozeßordnung (Munich: Beck, 1992), § 128.2. 
101 Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 10. 
102 Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 168. 
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thinking that Roman trials were oral because the Romans were mindful of this 
principle and its advantages, rather than, e.g., some combination of illiteracy, 
time limitations, available methods of writing and duplication, etc.103  A 
second example arises under the "principle of publicity."  Bethmann-Hollweg 
says that the principle governed both during the formulary procedure and the 
earlier legis actio procedure.104  He then goes on to argue that civil trials 
before a single judge were always public.105  The problem here is that a legal 
system which follows "the principle of publicity" is not simply holding trials 
in public, but observing a principle of due process.  According to the principle, 
public participation acts as a restraint on abuses of procedure.106  The converse 
of "publicity" is not "privacy" but "secrecy,"107 and in this respect Bethmman-
Hollweg is assuming a great deal about the reasons for public trials in Rome.  
If he had said that Roman trials were characterized by "a desire not to be 
secret" his assumptions would be more obviously incorrect.108 
 
103 Schulz makes some general observations on the Romans' reluctance to recognize 
formality through writing in legal acts, law making, and civil procedure.  Schulz, Roman 
Legal Science, 25-26.  He attributes this reluctance to a "deliberate and reasoned policy of the 
legal profession" to favor solemnization by persons in one another's presence.  Ibid., 26.  This 
explanation is different from Seidl's, but as with Seidl's explanation, it is difficult to know how 
much "deliberateness" to attribute to the fact that presentations in a Roman trials were made 
orally.  Could the limited means of writing be a factor?  It would be difficult to make a 
"written submission" of points and arguments with the usual means of recording matters for 
litigation: the waxed, wooden tablet.  It was disposible, not permanent, and easily forged.  For 
a description see Giuseppe Camodeca, Tabulae Pompeianae Sulpiciorum (TPSulp.): Edizione 
critica dell' archivio puteolano dei Sulpicii (Rome: Quasar, 1999), 1:31-36. 
104 Bethmann-Hollweg, Civilprozeß, 1:75, 2:161.  Similarly, Kaser/Hackl, 
Zivilprozessrecht, 11. 
105 Bethmann-Hollweg, Civilprozeß, 2:161-64. 
106 See Freckmann and Wegerich, German Legal System, 128-29, and especially Millar, 
"Formative Principles," 69 ("Forced upon public attention by the revolutionary reaction, in 
France, against the secret, inquisitorial criminal trials of the former régime, [the principle of 
publicity] occupied the center of the stage in Continental discussions of judicature for upwards 
of fifty years thereafter."). 
107 Millar, "Formative Principles," 68-69. 
108 Some trials, contrary to Bethmann-Hollweg, were indeed held in private houses.  See 
Kelly, Civil Judicature, 110-11; Frier, Roman Jurists, 204; Crook, Legal Advocacy, 136.  This 
does not mean the idea of publicity is surrendered, Frier, Roman Jurists, 204, but it is another 
matter entirely whether such trials satisfied the process requirements of "the principle of 
publicity."  For the idea that the publicity of Roman trials aided their legitimacy, see ibid., 
241. 
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Immediacy and Orality 
Two principles are especially relevant to trials before the judge.  The principle 
of orality has been mentioned; closely related is the principle of immediacy, 
which tries to preserve the integrity of a judgment by ensuring that arguments 
and proof are put to the judge in the most direct manner possible.  Under this 
principle it is a virtue for a judgment to be given by the very person who 
considers the proof and hears the parties' recitals.  If either of these acts is 
performed by a deputy, then the procedure is "mediate."109  Any delay 
between presentation and judgment is likewise contrary to the principle.110  
The principle of orality is related to the principle of immediacy, in the sense 
that a system of procedure which encourages allegations, proof, or arguments 
to be put orally to the judge furthers the cause of immediacy. 
Some works say that private lawsuits in Rome were characterized by 
orality and immediacy.111  The evidence usually cited is a supposed rule 
governing the conduct of trials from the time of the Twelve Tables to at least 
the time of Cicero.  The rule states that a civil trial112 must not last more than 
one day: pleading, proof, argument, and judgment must take place on the same 
day, the judgment being given before sunset (the "one-day rule").113  If 
judgment cannot be given before sunset, then the case must begin anew on 
another day, with at least some of the events of the previous session being 
repeated.114 
 
109 Adolf Baumbach, Wolfgang Lauterbach, et al. (edd.), Zivilprozessordnung, 59th ed. 
(Munich: Beck, 2001), § 128(1) ("Unmittelbarkeit bedeutet: Es ist vor dem Gericht selbst zu 
verhandeln, nicht vor einem Dritten oder vor einem anderen Gericht, das nur dasjenige 
übermitteln kann, das vor ihm geschehen ist."). 
110 Millar, "Formative Principles," 62-63; Freckmann and Wegerich, German Legal 
System, 143. 
111 See Kaser/Hackl, Zivilprozessrecht, 10-11; Wenger, Institutionen, 194; Engelmann, 
"Modern Continental Procedure," 606; Millar, "Formative Principles," 50, 63; Bethmann-
Hollweg, Civilprozeß, 2:587. 
112 "Civil trial" here would include both trials before a single judge and trials before 
recuperatores, at least according to the usual view, which includes a passage from Cicero, pro 
Tullio—a matter tried before recuperatores—as evidence for the rule.  See below notes 125 
and 127 and accompanying text.    
113 The one-day rule is discussed at length in Ernest Metzger, A New Outline of the 
Roman Civil Trial (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 101-22.  Modern authorities which cite 
the rule with approval are cited ibid., 101 n.2, to which should be added Kaser/Hackl, 
Zivilprozessrecht, 51, 68, 117; Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 167; Baron, Institutionen, 
425. 
114 See A. H. J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1901), 271; F. L. von Keller, Der römische Civilprocess und die Actionen, 6th ed. rev. 
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 The virtues of immediacy and orality are perhaps more obvious here than 
in any other aspect of the Roman trial, and in discussing the rule the older 
procedural writers make their clearest statements about the judge and his 
office.  The core of their view is that a judge who must make a decision within 
the limits of this rule will have a vivid picture of the case in mind and thereby 
be less liable to make a mistake.  Bethmann-Hollweg, writing in 1864, says: 
115 
The aim of this extremely narrow time limit lay . . . mainly in the fact that out of a 
coherent and vivid development of the case, passing into the judge's understanding as, in 
one sitting, the hurried litigant furnishes it, the truest conviction on the part of the judge 
will develop.  Indeed it is for this reason that our own jury courts follow nearly the same 
principle. 
The main virtue of the rule and the attendant principles is the accuracy of the 
judge's decision as Baron, writing in 1884, confirms:116 
The entire proceeding must also be carried out to completion in one day so that, there 
being no written record, the judge can give judgment with a fresh impression of what he 
hears.  If this is not possible, the judge announces an adjournment, and the proceeding 
begins anew on a new date, and factual material in particular is presented again. 
The repetition of events in the subsequent hearing is an important qualification 
to the rule; it helps to ensure the accuracy of the decision, if in fact the trial 
 
A. Wach (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1883), 337-38.  On repetition of events after 
adjournment in modern German procedure, see Lüke and Walchshöfer, Münchener 
Kommentar, § 128.6; Peter Arens and Wolfgang Lüke, Zivilprozeßrecht: Erkenntnisverfahren, 
Zwangvollstreckung, 7th ed. (Munich: Beck, 1999), 22. 
115 Bethmann-Hollweg, Der römische Civilprozeß, 1:184 (emphasis added): 
Der Zweck dieser äußersten Zeitbeschränkung lag . . . überwiegend wohl darin, daß aus 
der zusammenhängenden, lebendigen und im Bewußtsein zu überschauenden Entfaltung 
der Sache, wie sie das gedrängte Plaidoner Einer Sitzung gewährt, die wahrste 
Überzeugung des Richters sich bildet, weshalb ja auch unsre Geschwornengerichte 
annähernd denselben Grundsatz befolgen. 
See also Bethmann-Hollweg, Der römische Civilprozeß, 2:591. 
116 Baron, Institutionen, 425 (emphasis added): 
Die gesammte Verhandlung muß auch jetzt an Einem Tage durchgeführt werden, damit 
bei dem Mangel schriftlicher Aufzeichnung das Urtheil unter dem frischen Eindruck des 
Gehörten ergehe; ist dies nicht möglich, so wird vom Geschwornen die Ampliatio 
ausgesprochen, und in einem neuen Termin . . . die Verhandlung von Neuem begonnen, 
namentlich das thatsächliche Material nochmals entwickelt. 
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cannot finish in one day, as Wenger explained in 1925:117 
[With the one-day rule] the judge could give his decision under the freshest impression of 
the proceedings taking place orally before him.  Proceedings are often both oral and 
immediate. . . .  [In bigger cases] the advocates' recitals, recapitulating all of the substance 
of the arguments and proof, easily preserved the immediacy of the proceedings. 
There are good reasons to believe, however, that the one-day rule did not 
exist at all.118  Its existence depends on a very narrow and unnatural reading of 
the sources.  The main source of the rule is the following text from the Twelve 
Tables:119 
XII Tab. I, 9: 
si ambo praesentes, sol occasus suprema tempestas esto. 
If both [parties] are present, sunset shall be the latest time. 
The words of the Twelve Tables have been assembled piecemeal from sources 
much later than the law itself, and context is often difficult to determine.  The 
modern editors of the Twelve Tables have suggested that this text refers to the 
hearing before the magistrate rather than trial before the judge,120 though 
conceivably the sunset rule could apply to both.  Assuming it does apply to 
 
117 Wenger, Institutionen, 194 (emphasis added): 
Dann konnte der Geschworene unter dem frischen Eindruck der mündlich vor ihm 
abgeführten Verhandlung urteilen.  Mündlichkeit und Unmittelbarkeit des Verfahrens 
verbanden sich schon da miteinander. . . .  Die Unmittelbarkeit des Verfahrens wurde in 
[größeren Sachen] leicht durch eine alles Wesentliche von Behauptungen und Beweisen 
rekapitulierende Anwaltsrede gewahrt. 
118 I suspect that the first to announce the rule was Huschke, in an 1826 commentary on 
Cicero, pro Tullio: P. E. Huschke, "M. Tullii Ciceronis orationis pro M. Tullio quae exstant 
cum commentariis et excursibus," in Analecta Litteraria, ed. I. G. Huschke (Leipzig: 
Hartmann, 1826), 106-107.  I can find no trace of it earlier, and in particular no trace in two 
earlier works where one would otherwise expect it to be mentioned: Heffter, Institutionen, and 
Heinrich Eduard Dirksen, Uebersicht der bisherigen Versuche zur Kritik und Herstellung des 
Textes der Zwölftafelfragmente (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1824).  Other early authorities for the 
rule are Keller, Der römische Civilprocess, 283-84 (in the 1852 edition) and Bethmann-
Hollweg (see note 115 above).  Rein, writing after Keller but before Bethmann-Hollweg, is 
also an early authority, though he mentions the rule only in passing.  Wilhelm Rein, Das 
Privatrecht und der Zivilprozeß der Römer, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: F. Fleischer, 1858; reprinted 
Aalen: Scientia, 1964), 884 & n.2, 921 n.1.  I suggest below that the endurance of this rule in 
the literature is due to the impetus of the Historical School. 
119 This is the text of Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 2:594. 
120 Ibid., 2:596. 
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trials, the meaning of suprema tempestas is the main point of dispute.  
Proponents of the one-day rule assume that it means "the latest instant," so that 
the text as a whole announces "sunset shall be the latest instant [for trial]."  
The alternative is that suprema tempestas means "the latest time of day," 
which would suggest a different rule, that trials (or proceedings before the 
magistrate) could not take place at night.  The modern editors would support 
the second alternative: "Note that a ban on proceedings at night need not 
preclude resumption the following day."121  In their favor is the fact that the 
sources for this text expressly treat suprema tempestas (and the shortened term 
suprema) as a time of day,122 and the lex Plaetoria (post 241 BC) is known to 
have clarified the time of day deemed to be suprema.123  None of the sources 
for XII Tab. I, 9 suggests "instant," "point of demarcation," or "end point" for 
tempestas.124  To find support for "latest instant" one must go outside the 
Twelve Tables and its sources: in Cicero's pro Tullio and Tacitus' Dialogus 
there are references to advocates "using up the day" (diem eximere) by 
speaking too long, and in the pro Quinctio Cicero charges his opponent with 
speaking so long he leaves no time for judgment.125  In the first two passages, 
the proponents of the one-day rule must presumably take diem as something 
like a technical term for "the one allotted day," and in the last passage would 
infer that judgment must be given on the day Cicero is speaking.  These 
interpretations are possible, but it is equally possible the three passages are 
reciting the ordinary remarks of an impatient advocate.126  In any event, the 
modern editors of the Twelve Tables are unconvinced: "Cicero, Tull. 6, and 
Quinct. 34, manifestly do not prove that the hearing of cases was limited to a 
 
121 Ibid. 
122 The three sources which discuss suprema in context are Macrobius, Saturnalia 
1.3.14; Censorinus, de Die Natali 24; Varro, de Lingua Latina 6.5. 
123 See Censorinus, de Die Natali 24; J. A. Crook, "Lex Plaetoria (FIRA no. 3)," 
Athenaeum (n.s.) 62 (1984): 592-95.  The newest text of the lex Plaetoria is in Roman 
Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, vol. 2, no. 44. 
124 Cf. Joseph Georg Wolf, "Diem diffindere: Die Vertagung im Urteilstermin nach der 
lex Irnitana," in Thinking Like a Lawyer, ed. Paul McKechnie (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 34-36.  
There is also the problem of determining when "sunset" occurs on overcast days.  Crook has 
suggested that one aim of the lex Plaetoria was to clarify the end of the judicial day when the 
moment of sunset was not obvious.  Crook, "Lex Plaetoria," 592.  The uncertainty of the 
moment of sunset would be only an annoyance to a judicial magistrate or to a judge required 
to adjourn at sunset, but very contentious to parties whose suit was regarded as closed at 
sunset.  Removing that point of contention might have been an aim of the lex Plaetoria, 
though parties would have waited a long time for relief. 
125 Cicero, pro Tullio 6; Tacitus, Dialogus 19.2; Cicero, pro Quinctio 34. 
126 See Metzger, New Outline, 118-19. 
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day . . . ."127 
 Here it is enough to say that the older procedural writers have read the 
sources in a very selective way.  The excerpts above128 suggest they have done 
so because they have in mind a particular kind of judge: one whose 
impressions of the case must be cultivated with the help of orality and 
immediacy.  Persons familiar with German procedure will know that this kind 
of judge is a very modern one.  A commentary to the German Code of Civil 
Procedure describes hearings before the judge in this way:129 
The merits of an oral hearing are obvious.  The parties' recitals give a vivid picture of the 
actual circumstances of the case and the matters in dispute.  Gaps and uncertainties in 
their presentations can be easily taken care of, misunderstandings corrected. 
Immediacy serves many of the same purposes as orality.  A textbook on 
German law says, typically: "[T]he court which has to deliver the ruling 
must—due to [the principle of immediacy]—obtain the most direct impression 
of the case."130  Similarly, a German textbook on procedure, speaking of a rule 
limiting the re-presentation of factual material before a second judge, says 
"Such a rule however withholds from the reviewing court the very essential 
impressions which immediate contact with the parties and evidence 
provides."131  Whether accurate impressions were similarly demanded in 
Roman trials is the question.  That this view of the judge is modern does not 
mean it cannot be Roman.  Yet this view first arose, so far as I can determine, 
only in the middle of the nineteenth century,132 and modern textbooks of 
 
127 Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 2:596.  They do not mention the passage from 
Tacitus here.  Immediately following the quoted text, the editors cite lex Coloniae Genetivae, 
ch. CII, where there is indeed an indirect reference to a one-day trial, though not a civil trial 
before a single judge.  See Roman Statutes, ed. M. Crawford, 1:409. 
128 Above, notes 115 to 117. 
129 Lüke and Walchshöfer, Münchener Kommentar, § 128.2: "Die Vorzüge der 
mundlichen Verhandlung liegen auf der Hand.  Der Vortrag der Parteien bietet ein 
anschauliches Bild des Lebenssachverhaltes und der Streitpunkte.  Lücken und Unklarheiten 
ihres Vorbringens lassen sich leicht beseitigen, Mißverständnisse beheben." 
130 Freckmann and Wegerich, German Legal System, 143.  
131 Arens and Lüke, Zivilprozeßrecht, 24: "Ein solche Regelung enthält dem 
erkennenden Gericht aber sehr wesentliche Eindrücke vor, die sich aus dem unmittelbaren 
Kontakt mit den Parteien und den Beweismitteln . . . ergeben."  Some comparisons between 
the one-day rule and the 1877 Deutsche Zivilprozessordnung are given in Metzger, New 
Outline, 121-22.  The modern rules governing the immediacy and orality of hearings are in 
ZPO § 128. 
132 On the early authorities for the one-day rule, see note 118 above.  Huschke (1826) 
announced the rule without expressing any view of the Roman judge, and Keller (1852) 
simply added authorities.  But Bethmann-Hollweg (1864-65) associated the rule with a 
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Roman law tend not to describe the Roman judge in this way, even though the 
one-day rule still occasionally appears.133  I suggest below that this view of the 
judge had its origin in the program of the Historical School. 
Decisions as Data 
It was the general aim of the Historical School, first, to uncover by historical 
research the actual, subsisting law, and second, to find, realize, and refine the 
system that lies within that law.134  Because the raw "data" for the law was 
properly found only by historical research, Savigny saw no reason to confuse 
the historical method by distinguishing theory from practice:135 
 
particular view of the judge. 
133 Kaser cites the rule without any reference to immediacy or orality, Kaser/Hackl, 
Zivilprozessrecht, 51, 68, 117.  For him, "immediacy" in Roman procedure is represented by 
the fact that the judge gives judgment without the intervention of a deputy.  Ibid., 10-11.  Seidl 
regards the one-day rule as an example of "the principle of speed" rather than immediacy or 
orality.  Seidl, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 166-67.  David says the rule existed "pour 
convaincre un juge hésitant."  Jean-Michel David, Le Patronat Judiciaire au Dernier Siècle de 
la République Romaine (Rome: École Française de Rome, 1992), 7. 
134 See Reimann, "Nineteenth Century German Legal Science," 879-81; Wieacker, 
History, 308-14; Joachim Rückert, "The Unrecognized Legacy: Savigny's Influence on 
German Jurisprudence after 1900," American Journal of Comparative Law 37 (1989): 133; 
Hermann Kantorowicz, "Savigny and the Historical School," Law Quarterly Review 53 
(1937): 332-33. 
135 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, "Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtswissenschaft," in Thibaut und Savigny: zum 100jährigen Gedächtnis des Kampfes um 
einheitliches bürgerliches Recht für Deutschland, 1814–1914, ed. Jacques Stern (Berlin: 
Vahlen, 1914)(reproduction of the first edition of 1814), 145-46 ("[Die] Annäherung der 
Theorie und Praxis ist es, wovon die eigentliche Besserung der Rechtspflege ausgehen muß, 
und worin wir vorzüglich von den Römern zu lernen haben: auch unsere Theorie muß 
praktischer und unsere Praxis wissenschaftlicher werden, als sie bisher war."); Zimmermann, 
"Savigny's Legacy," 584 ("A legal practice informed and sustained by legal scholarship, and 
an approach to legal scholarship that is always mindful of the fact that, ultimately, law serves 
an eminently practical function: that is what Savigny was aiming for.").  The supposed 
opposition between theory and practice was resolved by the historical and systematic methods 
of the Historical School; the only real opposition was between historical and unhistorical 
methods.  F. C. von Savigny, "Ueber den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift," Zeitschrift für 
geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft 1 (1815): 14-15 ("[N]ur zwischen dem geschichtliche und 
ungeschichtliche waltet ein absoluter Gegensatz, das praktische geschäft hingegen kann mit 
dem feinsten wissenschaftlichen Sinn betrieben werden . . . ."); Heinz Mohnhaupt, "Richter 
und Rechtsprechung im Werk Savignys," in Studien zur Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, ed. 
Walter Wilhelm (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), 250-51. 
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The convergence of theory and practice is the starting point for genuine improvement in 
the administration of justice, and something which we must learn from the Romans in 
particular: our theory must become more practical, and our practice more scientific than it 
has been up to now. 
For present purposes, the convergence of theory and practice had two 
important consequences, somewhat opposed to each other.  On the one hand, 
making practice more scientific limits the significance of a single case.  A 
person can learn from a single case, Savigny says, only if he also keeps before 
him a picture of the whole of the law.136  On the other hand, the products of 
practice—including the decisions of courts—can have scientific worth as 
historical data, and therefore can be the object of investigation and 
research.137  (Mohnhaupt charts the development of Savigny's thinking on this 
very point, showing that by the 1840s Savigny's work was relying to a much 
greater degree on the citation of court decisions, though of course Savigny 
continued to reject the idea that a decision could have any precedential 
force.138)  To fulfill this goal of combining theory and practice, it was 
important that the judge's office not be reduced to the mechanical application 
of texts; the bench should be staffed by "intellectually charged persons" 
(geistreiche Menschen) with exposure to developing theory.139  The reform of 
procedure would help to bring about this desired state of affairs.140 
  The procedural writers who followed Savigny, I suggest, accepted the 
scientific worth of a judge's decision: it is for that reason that the Roman judge 
must be furnished with procedures which will give his decisions value as 
historical data.  The Romans, on this view, have consciously or unconsciously 
introduced the principles of immediacy and orality in order to allow the judge 
to gain the clearest impression of the case.  It is essential that the judge gain 
the clearest impression, because only then will his decision be the "true" 
one,141 expressing the sense of right felt by his fellow Romans.142  The judge, 
 
136 Savigny, "Vom Beruf," 146. 
137 Mohnhaupt, "Richter und Rechtsprechung," 260.   
138 Ibid., 260-63. 
139 Savigny, "Vom Beruf," 147. 
140 Ibid., 148. 
141 "Der Proceß ist eine Einrichtung . . .  welche den Richter in der Ermittlung der 
Wahrheit beschränkt und hemmt . . . ."  Rudolph von Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts auf 
den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1888), 
3:16 (emphasis added).  See also Bethmann-Hollweg, in the passage quoted above 
accompanying note 115. 
142 See Rudolph Sohm, Ludwig Mitteis, and Leopold Wenger, Institutionen: Geschichte 
und System des römischen Privatrechts, 17th ed. (Munich: Duncker and Humblot, 1923), 648; 
Baron, Institutionen, 354. 
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one should note, is neither mechanically applying rules, nor expressing his 
own opinion (as Ihering says, the judge's decision might go against his own 
convictions143).  The value of his decision as historical data arises from his 
authenticity as a voice for this shared sense of right, as this passage from 
Baron makes clear:144 
The essence of the institution of the [Roman] judge lies in the fact that judgments in legal 
disputes take place, not through government officials, but through men: men who spring 
directly from The People.  This arrangement has two advantages: (1) certain citizens . . . 
are summoned to take part in public affairs, and not just for voting, but for a profound 
intellectual activity; (2) the law assumes a quality of nationhood; this is because the 
judge, in giving judgment, automatically uses the concept of Right that lives in The 
People. . . .  Here it should be emphasized that the institution of the judge in Rome knew 
nothing of the modern distinction between "factual" and "legal" questions; the Roman 
judge ruled on both alike; . . . . 
An authentic decision, of course, is not law, but only the data for law,145 and 
 
143 Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts, 3:16. 
144 Baron, Institutionen, 354 (emphasis added): 
Das Wesen des Geschworneninstituts besteht darin, daß die Beurtheilung von 
Rechtsstreitigkeiten nicht durch staatliche Beamte sondern durch Männer erfolgt, welche 
unmittelbar aus dem Volke hervorgehen.  In dieser Einrichtung sind zwei Vortheile 
enthalten: (1) es werden dadurch gewisse Bürger . . . zur Theilnahme an den öffentlichen 
Angelegenheiten herangezogen, und zwar nicht in der Weise des bloßen Stimmgebens 
sondern in derjenigen einer gründlichen geistigen Thätigkeit; (2) es wird dadurch dem 
Recht der Character der Volksthümlichkeit erhalten; denn der Geschworne bringt ohne 
Bedenken die im Volke lebenden Rechtsidee bei seinem Urtheil zur Anwendung; . . . .  
Dabei verdient hervorgehoben zu werden, daß dem Römischen Geschworneninstitut die 
moderne Unterscheidung der sog. That- und Rechtsfragen unbekannt ist; der Römische 
Geschworne urtheilt sowohl über die That- wie über die Rechtsfragen; . . . . 
Similarly, James Muirhead, Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome, 3rd ed. rev. 
H. Goudy and A. Grant (London: A & C Black, Ltd, 1916), 234: "[T]he gradual ascendancy 
and eventual unanimity of judicial opinion in the affirmative was but the expression of the 
general sentiment of the citizens of whom the judices were the represenatives." 
145 Sohm describes the two spheres in vivid language: 
The practical function of jurisprudence is to fit the raw material of law for practical use.  
For the law, as begotten by custom or statute, is but the raw material, and is never 
otherwise than imperfect or incomplete. . . .  It is the function of jurisprudence to convert 
the imperfect and incomplete law which it receives at the hands of customs and statutes 
into a law which shall be complete and free from omissions.  In other words, it is its 
function to transform the raw material into a work of art. 
Rudoph Sohm, The Institutes: A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law, 
3rd ed. trans. J. C. Ledlie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 28.   
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even as data it is not necessarily valuable to a jurist.  A jurist, like any 
scientist, is not interested in every event which corroborates what he already 
knows.  But any data which deserves the name must be produced under the 
proper conditions: procedural principles are an essential part of those 
conditions, because they help to ensure the accuracy of the data. 
In short, the procedural writers admired Roman procedure as a model for 
the modern law, but in their enthusiasm to complete the model they assigned 
to the Romans their own contemporary desire for authentic decisions, and then 
equipped the judge with the procedural principles needed to achieve them. 
Precedent 
From this view of the Roman judge, certain ideas naturally followed.  Case 
law of course is impossible; it mistakes the data for the scientific finding.  
Another idea, particularly important here, is that no judge could take any 
interest in what another judge had done.  Each judge takes an impression of 
the rights and wrongs in the specific case before him, and from that impression 
gives a yes-or-no decision.146  That decision, on this view, is useless to a 
subsequent judge.  He has no reason to import a distillation of the impressions 
of another judge, taken from other facts, into his own case.  To use an example 
from the physical sciences: a falling body does not accelerate at a certain rate 
because another falling body accelerates at that rate, but because it obeys a law 
on the acceleration of falling bodies.  In the same way a judge obeys the law, 
not single manifestations of the law. 
This view therefore leaves no room for a theory of precedent like 
Jolowicz's.  Judges would not rely on past court decisions, because there is 
nothing to learn from them.  Those decisions remain discrete expressions of 
what is right in a specific case.  This is true even if, as Jolowicz suggests, the 
judges of republican Rome did not always have jurists to advise them.  
Nothing in this view, however, belittles the judge or his office: his decisions 
lack the ability to instruct other judges, not because he is untrained or only 
permitted to decide questions of fact, but because he fulfills the necessary, 
admired, and almost oracular role of announcing what is true for the facts 
before him. 
This view of the Roman judge is not a modern one, and the question is 
whether with its disappearance the common opinion could acknowledge a 
 
146 Ihering suggests that each suit presents a single question, to be answered yes or no: 
does the claim exist?  Ihering, Geist des römischen Rechts, 3:21-23. 
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practice of judges following judges.  I suggested above that it could.  The 
common opinion rejects the idea that judges made law, but is not inconsistent 
with the idea that some judges relied on previous decisions.  This is an 
empirical question, different from the question of lawmaking.  Jolowicz has 
suggested that ideas were indeed exchanged among judges in this way, before 
jurists dominated legal advice.  Even if this exchange of ideas left nothing 
behind in the sources, the practice alone would be significant to historians.  It 
would affect their understanding of the judge's office, the conduct of trials, and 
the development of professional advice.  Most importantly, the silence of the 
common opinion on this notion of precedent should not be taken as a rejection.  
The silence, I have suggested, is due to a discarded, historical theory of 
lawmaking which borrows substantially from its own time. 
The second part of Jolowicz's argument is on a different footing: he argues 
that through their decisions judges contributed to the development of the law.  
Dawson, Collinet, and Tellegen-Couperus have also suggested that judges 
contributed to the development of the law.  The irony here is that the 
discarded, historical theory accommodates this view better than the common 
opinion.  On the one hand, the procedural writers discussed above would 
presumably argue that a Roman judge's decision, though authentic, would 
rarely provide anything new for a jurist to ponder; a jurist, after all, would 
probably have advised the judge in the first place.  On the other hand, they 
might admit that in the rare case a judge's decision could reveal a genuinely 
new piece of information.  To borrow Dawson's example: a judge might make 
a decision on whether a certain act constituted good faith.147  The procedural 
writers would regard this decision as new data, awaiting the examination of 
the jurist.  Jolowicz would say that this decision contributes to the 
development of the law.  These are not so very different.     
The common opinion, however, does not easily accommodate the idea that 
judges contributed to the development of the law.  This is because it regards 
judicial decisions as no more than evidence for the law.148  But here the 
common opinion is at its weakest, at least so far as the late republic is 
concerned.  Special juristic training may have created some manner of division 
between "law" and "evidence for the law," but Jolowicz is suggesting very 
plausibly that this division was not so clear until "the growth of responsa in 
the early Empire caused less attention to be paid to precedents at Rome."149  
This is exactly where Kaser's account of the ascendancy of jurists should give 
 
147 Dawson, The Oracles of the Law, 104. 
148 See note 40 above. 
149 Jolowicz, "Case Law," 15. 
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way, in particular his assumption that the authority to interpret the law passed 
seamlessly from the pontifices to a ready fraternity of jurists.150  This account 
is impatient to see jurists off the mark, giving advice to judges, and passes 
over the irregular development of the jurists' profession.151  If precedents were 
observed in the late republic, then lawmaking followed a far less orderly 
division of labor than the common opinion acknowledges. 
 The more general point is that Roman law has been admired for a long 
time, but sometimes for qualities it does not have.  Procedure, like private law, 
has been a victim of this.  Principles of procedure have sometimes played an 
unhelpful role.  Writers of the past have discovered ideas in the sources that 
were not really there.  They did so, not because they were careless, but 
because Roman law is inherently rich.  But a historian, like a husband, must 
beware of old admirers. 
 
150 See note 44 above.  Similarly, Alan Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1995), 39-40, 60. 
151 See, e.g., Frier, Roman Jurists, 155-58, 252-54. 
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